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Abstract  
 
This paper analyzes the impact of European state aid control in the new Member states. Two 
main  arguments  are  derived  from  comparisons  of  state  aid  policies  over  time  and  across 
countries: First, changes in CEECs’ state aid policies can mainly be traced backed to the 
(anticipated) impact of post-accession state aid control by the European Commission rather 
than to accession conditionality. Second, despite strong tendencies of policy convergence we 
observe persistently different national strategies in dealing with European state aid control. 
More generally, studying the domestic impact of European state aid control provides us with a 
telling example of the peculiarities of complying with rules of negative integration.  
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1  Introduction 
This paper analyzes the impact of European state aid control in the new Member states. The 
control  of  national  state  aid  policies  is  a  highly  relevant  policy  area,  from  a  political 
perspective as well as for scientific reasons. State aid measures always create winners and 
losers  and,  thus,  state  aid  control  by  the  European  Commission  directly  impacts  on 
distributive  questions.  Moreover,  although  the  Commission’s  main  task  is  regulative  – 
protecting competition – state aid control often involves balancing the goal of undistorted 
competition against other policy goals such as competitiveness or cohesion. In most Central 
and  Eastern  European  Countries  (CEECs),  state  aid  has  become  an  important  instrument 
during the process of economic transformation, as a means to restructure their traditional 
industries as well as in order to attract new investments.  
Despite its salience, however, state aid control remains seriously under-researched from a 
political  science  perspective.  The  adjustment  of  the  CEECs’  state  aid  policies  towards 
European standards so far has almost exclusively been dealt with in a legal (Schütterle 2002; 
Cremona  2003a)  or  economic  context  (Atanasiu  2001;  Hashi/Balcerowicz  2004).  More 
generally,  we  can  observe  a  certain  neglect  for  some  core  areas  of  –  mainly  negative  – 
European  integration  (Franchino  2005;  Schmidt/Blauberger/Van  den  Nouland  2007),  also 
within the literature on the European impact in the new Member states (Sedelmeier 2006a: 
17). As will be shown, however, the process of adjusting to and complying with rules of 
negative integration is different from transposing European policies into national law.  
The domestic impact of European state aid control in the new Member states will be analyzed 
by  two  different  comparisons.  First,  the  institutional  settings  in  state  aid  control  and  the 
CEECs’  state  aid  policies  before  and  after  accession  will  be  compared.  Second,  different 
groups of new Member states will be distinguished according to their state aid policies and 
Poland and the Czech Republic will be discussed in greater detail. The analysis is based on 
two main sources. On the one hand, data on the state aid policies of EU Member states and on 
individual cases under investigation is provided by the European Commission’s State Aid 
Scoreboard
1 and its State Aid Register
2. On the other hand, background interviews with 39 
officials at Commission level as well as at Member state level have been conducted.  
Two main arguments are derived from the comparisons over time and across countries: First, 
changes in CEECs’ state aid policies can mainly be traced backed to the (anticipated) impact 
of  post-accession  state  aid  control  by  the  European  Commission  rather  than  to  accession 
                                                 
1 Online: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/studies_reports.html [05.05.2007]. 
2 Online: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/state_aid/register/ii/ [05.05.2007].   4 
conditionality  (section  2).  Second,  despite  strong  tendencies  of  policy  convergence  we 
observe persistently different national strategies in dealing with European state aid control 
(section 3). In the concluding section, the analysis will be put in the broader context of the 
peculiarities of implementing and complying with rules of negative integration.  
2  Comparison I: State Aid Policies Before and After 
Accession 
Different from other policy areas in which the transposition and implementation of European 
rules into national law has been the main accession requirement for the CEECs and different 
from what the progress reports of the Commission might suggest, adjusting national state aid 
policies to European standards has not been a process of continuous approximation. Both, 
with  respect  to  the  institutions  of  state  aid  control  as  well  as  regards  the  main  state  aid 
policies, the year 2004 marks a crucial turning point for the CEECs. Only by the date of 
accession,  the  exclusive  competence  to  control  national  state  aid  measures  has  been 
transferred to the European Commission and since then, state aid policies in most of the new 
Member states have changed significantly. 
The  observed  rupture  in  the  state  aid  policies  of  the  new  Member  states  has  one  more 
methodological and one more substantive implication: First, focusing on systematic changes 
just before or after  accession enables us at least in parts to isolate the specific European 
impact on the new Member states from other, global or national, factors. Second, the observed 
developments  contrast  with  expectations  derived  from  the  literature  on  EU  enlargement, 
particularly  as  regards  the  impact  of  accession  conditionality  and  its  potential  lack  of 
sustainability.  
2.1  Learning to Play the Game 
European state aid control does not require Member states to adopt national rules, but to 
consider European rules in the making of their state aid policies. Accordingly, the CEECs 
were not obliged to transpose the entire complex of European state aid law into national law 
in order to fulfil the acquis accession criterion. Instead, they had to establish a temporary 
system of national state aid control authorities. Until accession, these authorities had to play a 
similar role on a national level as the Commission plays on the European level – applying and 
enforcing European state aid rules and, thus, bringing national state aid policies in line with 
European law. The main effect of this Commission strategy, however, has not been to realize 
a fully fledged system of national state aid control and a continuous alignment of national   5 
state aid policies but a thorough exercise of the CEECs in dealing with the principles and the 
procedure of European state aid control: “Harmonisation in this context takes on a specific 
character, one that is more about learning to play the game than about borrowing the rules” 
(Cremona 2003b: 287). 
 
European state aid control is based on Articles 87 to 89 of the EC Treaty and its interpretation 
by  the  Commission  decisions  and  soft  law  as  well  as  judgments  of  the  European  courts. 
Article  87  (1)  EC  broadly  defines  the  notion  of  ‘state  aid’  (Plender  2003)  and  generally 
prohibits national state aid measures that might distort competition in the internal market. 
Article 87 (2) EC and, more importantly, Article 87 (3) EC list the exemptions from this 
prohibition, mainly interpreted in the Commission’s soft law. Article 88 EC contains the basic 
procedural  rules  of  the  European  state  aid  control  system,  empowering  the  European 
Commission to take the leading role. Finally, Article 89 EC provides the basis for secondary 
legislation on state aid which has only been used after 1998 to codify into hard law basic 
procedural issues and to exempt certain categories of state aid from ex ante control by the 
Commission.   
The CEECs’ commitment to adapt national state aid policies to European rules dates back to 
the entry into force of the Europe Agreements. Each of these agreements included a provision 
on  the  prohibition  of  state  aid  which  is  very  close  to  the  wording  of  Article  87  (1)  EC, 
followed  by  another  provision  on  possible  exemptions  to  this  prohibition  that  had  to  be 
assessed “on the basis of criteria arising from the application of the [EC Treaty] rules”. No 
procedural  and  legislative  prescriptions  equivalent  to  Articles  88  and  89  EC  have  been 
included in the Europe Agreements. Transposing and implementing the entire state aid acquis 
on the national level has been deemed unrealistic from the very beginning:  
“It is, however, impossible for any national legislature to transpose completely 
into national law all non-codified substantive State aid acquis elements (e.g. 
the definition of the notion of State aid – given that a binding and exhaustive 
substantive  Community  definition  does  not  exist)  including  all  relevant 
Commission  guidelines  […],  frameworks  […],  codes  […]  and  the  rapidly 
increasing  number  of  State  aid  judgements  of  the  Luxembourg  Courts” 
(Schütterle 2002: 582)  
In order to finalize accession negotiations on Chapter 6 (competition), the candidate countries 
had  to  fulfil  three  criteria:  administrative  capacity  (i.e.  the  establishment  of  national   6 
monitoring authorities), sufficient legislative alignment (i.e. the application of the state aid 
acquis), and a credible enforcement record.  
Between 1997 and 2001 all CEECs adopted national state aid laws.
3 On the one hand, these 
laws were only temporary transpositions of core elements of European state aid rules, leaving 
large parts of  European law without equivalent on the national level.  On the other hand, 
certain provisions went  beyond what is codified on the European level, e.g. in providing 
positive catalogues of potential types of state aid and exhaustively defining core terms to be 
applied.  Thus,  national  state  aid  laws  were  kept  understandable  also  for  legally  trained 
entrepreneurs and can be seen as a contribution to the spreading of knowledge on state aid 
control rather than a reproduction of the complete system of European state aid control on the 
national level.  
The role of the European Commission in state aid control was to be imitated by national state 
aid authorities. In most candidate countries, these authorities had already been established by 
the time national state  aid laws  came into force – sometimes as independent institutions, 
sometimes as subdivisions of the ministries of finance (Schütterle 2002: 580). Emulating the 
procedure of European state aid control, the granting of state aid became contingent on the 
notification to and approval by the respective national monitoring authorities.  
The enforcement record of the national authorities is hardly comparable due to very diverse 
approaches  in  different  CEECs  (Schütterle  2003:  31).  In  general,  the  number  of  negative 
decisions or even decisions to recover illegally granted state aid was relatively low (Schütterle 
2004: 489) and the Commission’s evaluation of the enforcement record of various national 
monitoring  authorities  remained  critical  even  in  its  last  comprehensive  monitoring  report 
2003.
4  An  important  side-effect  of  the  Commission’s  unprecedented  strategy  to  rely  on 
national state aid authorities, however, was the training of an administrative elite familiar with 
the rules and procedure of European state aid control.  
Accession negotiations on Chapter 6 were among the lengthiest and most controversial of all 
chapters. In some cases, negotiations on state aid issues were concluded only shortly before or 
even  synchronously  with  the  general  end  of  accession  negotiations  in  December  2002. 
Transitional  arrangements  have  been  concluded  with  the  majority  of  accession  countries 
except for Slovenia and the Baltic States (see Känkänen 2003). The Accession Treaty, finally, 
had important implications for state aid measures that were decided upon before accession 
                                                 
3 An overview of the accession preparations of individual CEECs is given in a series of articles in the European 
State Aid Law Quarterly (Hargita/Remetei Filep 2004; Jagodic-Lekoveciv 2004; Pelka 2004; Vosu 2004; Bednár 
2005; Lagzdina 2005; Cemnolonskis 2005; Andreou 2005). 
4 In the monitoring reports 2003 on the Czech Republic, Malta, Slovakia and Poland, the enforcement record of 
national state aid authorities is still considered as not entirely satisfactory.     7 
and that were still to be applied after accession. These measures had to be notified and at least 
implicitly to be approved by the Commission under the so called interim-procedure.
5  
Although the interim procedure enabled the Commission to exert its control function to a 
certain extent already with regard to state aid measures implemented before accession, the 
decisive institutional change took place with the date of accession. As of May 2004, national 
state  aid  laws  became  obsolete  and  had  to  be  replaced  by  new,  exclusively  procedural, 
provisions  in  the  CEECs.  Upon  accession,  national  state  aid  authorities  lost  all  their 
competences to approve state aid measures and the authority to control national state aids has 
been transferred to the Commission. State aid must not be granted before being approved by 
the Commission and in cases in which state aid is granted illegally, the Commission may 
order the recovery of state aid. National state aid authorities continue to play a certain role in 
most  CEECs  in  preparing  notifications  to  the  Commission,  disseminating  knowledge  on 
European state aid rules and collecting data on national state aid policies.  
Accession, however, has not only involved a loss of competences to the European level for 
the national monitoring authorities, but a major transformation of their role: during accession 
preparations, they were supposed to enforce EU law against the resistance of domestic state 
aid grantors and beneficiaries – after accession, they are demanded to help to push through 
certain notifications against reservations on part of the Commission. Negative assessments of 
aid measures by the national authorities are now being dealt with internally and informally in 
order  to  calculate  the  risk  of  a  Commission  investigation  and  to  prepare  against  possible 
objections of the Commission. At the same time, the Commission is less wiling to help the 
national authorities to fulfil their new function. While national case handlers could easily ask 
Commission officials for advice in enforcing European state aid rules before accession, they 
are now left alone with the task of convincing the Commission of the compatibility of certain 
aid measures.  
To summarize, we can distinguish to clearly different institutional settings in the field of state 
aid  control  before  and  after  accession.  The  differences  become  even  more  obvious  when 
analyzing the actual state aid policies of the CEECs.  
2.2  Key Indicators: State Aid Levels and Objectives  
The initial ‘misfit’ between European state aid control and post-communist state aid policies 
was significant. In the early stages of the economic transformation process of the CEECs, 
                                                 
5 Overall, 559 such interim measures have been notified (Roebling 2003). Except for several cases in which the 
Commission has opened formal investigations, it took until December 2005 until all these cases had been finally 
approved.   8 
state aid measures had a “strong ‘crisis management’ feature” (Hashi/Balcerowicz 2004: 3) 
and  were  mainly  designed  on  an  ad  hoc  basis  in  order  to  rescue  firms  in  difficulties. 
Typically,  state  aid  was  not  granted  in  the  form  of  direct  subsidies,  but  through  the  less 
transparent toleration of payment arrears in tax and social security payments (Atanasiu 2001; 
Atanasiu 2005). In contrast, the European Commission has repeatedly outlined the goals of a 
reduction  of  state  aid  expenditures  and  a  redirection  of  the  remaining  state  aid  towards 
transparent forms of state aid and horizontal objectives (e.g. not favoring particular sectors).
6 
Comparing new and old Member states according to their average state aid levels as well as 
their state aid objectives, we observe strong tendencies of convergence of the new towards the 
old Member states’ policies.
7 However, this process has not been  continuous, but can be 
separated into two different developments: Before accession, most CEECs were characterized 
by state aid policies significantly different and even diverging from those of the old Member 
states. After accession, the trend has been reversed and the new Member states’ policies have 
come close to the EU-15 average.  
State Aid Levels  
Reliable and comparable data on the state aid policies of the CEECs is only available from the 
year 2000 onwards.
8 From 2000 to 2003, the average aid level in the CEECs amounted to 
1.42% of the GDP as compared to only 0.39% in the old Member states. While the aid level 
peaked immediately before enlargement, in 2003, we observe a rapid decline after accession, 
clearly  below  the  values  of  the  years  2000  and  2001.  The  average  aid  level  in  the  new 
member states converges towards an almost stable average aid level in the old Member states.  
                                                 
6 These goals have been formulated by the 2000 European Council in Lisbon and, since then, have been repeated 
regularly  by  the  Commission,  most  prominently  in  its  State  Aid  Action  Plan  of  June  2005  (European 
Commission 2005). 
7 The amount of state aid in relation to the GDP is called state aid level. As to the state aid objectives, the 
Commission distinguishes between two broad categories: sectoral and horizontal (i.e. non-sectoral) state aid. 
Although the  goals of reducing and redirecting state aid towards horizontal objectives do not have binding 
character and, hence, do not exactly constitute standards of compliance or non-compliance, they provide us with 
aggregate indicators for national state aid policies and for the domestic impact of European state aid control. A 
more adequate standard of non-compliance would be the amount of state aid that was granted illegally and not 
yet recovered. As there have been only two Commission decision so far ordering recovery of illegal aid in the 
new Member states (see footnote 10), however, this standard is not yet applicable to the new Member states.   
8 Since July 2001, DG Competition publishes its bi-annual EU State aid Scoreboard. As to the new Member 
states, two Scoreboard issues included subsection with a special focus on these countries (autumn 2002 and 
autumn 2004 updates). In the autumn 2005 update, data on the new Member states’ policies after accession has 
been included into the regular Scoreboard for the first time.    9 
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Graph 1: State aid as a percentage of GDP; 
Source: Online EU State Aid Scoreboard, Autumn 2006 
 
Taking into account the institutional change in the area of state aid control that was described 
above, we can interpret the development of the CEECs’ policies as follows:  
For the period before accession, we cannot observe a reduction in the CEECs’ state aid levels 
that we should expect as a result of the credible enforcement of European state aid rules. We 
might consider the slight decline in aid levels from 2000 to 2001 as a result of these efforts. In 
2002 and 2003, however, state aid in the candidate countries has risen up to a level three times 
higher than in the old Member states. Particularly high amounts of state aid have been granted 
during the crisis of the Czech banking sector in 2002 and for the restructuring of the Polish 
coal  sector  in  2003.  Apparently,  several  of  the  CEECs  used  the  window  of  opportunity 
between the conclusion of accession negotiations and accession in order to grant considerable 
amounts of state aid to their industries – for the last time without full Commission control. 
Ironically,  this  development  demonstrates  that  the  candidate  countries  increasingly 
understood European state aid rules and the approaching constraints of Commission control. 
As a  result, the positive effect on state aid levels due to the anticipation of Commission 
control clearly dominated over the potentially negative effect of a credible enforcement of 
European state aid rules.    10 
By  contrast,  the  average  state  aid  level  in  the  CEECs  has  fallen  dramatically  in  2004;  it 
continued to fall in 2005 and has reached a level less than half of the one in 2000. The 
difference between old and new Member states has almost disappeared. Thus, the absence of 
accession  conditionality  has  not  undermined  the  domestic  impact  of  European  state  aid 
control in the CEECs. The instruments at the disposal of the Commission – its investigation 
powers and its competence to order recovery of illegally granted state aid – outweigh the loss 
of the stick of accession conditionality in the field of state aid.  
State Aid Objectives  
The picture gets even clearer when analyzing the objectives state aid is granted for in the new 
and old Member states. On average, the CEECs grant considerably higher shares of state aid 
to sectoral objectives than the EU-15 countries. Before accession, the share of horizontal aid 
has  even  been  constantly  falling  in  the  CEECs,  reaching  its  lowest  level  in  2003.  After 
accession, the share of horizontal aid has risen in the new Member states, rapidly catching up 
with the old Member states.  
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Graph 2: Share of state aid to horizontal objectives as a percentage of total aid; 
Source: Online EU State Aid Scoreboard, Autumn 2006 
 
Again, we can clearly distinguish between the CEECs’ state aid policies before and after 
accession.    11 
Despite the Commission’s preference for horizontal aid, the share of horizontal aid constantly 
fell until accession – accordingly, the share of sectoral aid grew. In general, the high demand 
for sectoral aid in the CEECs is related to the process of economic transformation. Sectoral 
aid is considered to be an important instrument in the course of restructuring and privatizing 
state-owned enterprises and in order to mitigate the social effects of this process (see Ellison 
2005). However, the continuous rise of sectoral aid before accession and its rapid decline after 
accession has not been paralleled by a similar process of economic transformation. The origin 
of this development can only be found in the CEECs’ adjustment to European state aid rules 
and their anticipation of Commission control. The constraints of European state aid law are 
particularly strict with regard to sectoral aid and, hence, several candidate countries took the 
last chance to subsidize the restructuring of their industries.  
After accession, the weight of horizontal aid in the new Member states has not only grown in 
relative terms due to the restrictions on sectoral aid – even in absolute terms and despite the 
general reduction of aid levels, horizontal aid has become more prominent in seven out of ten 
new Member states in 2005 as compared to the time before accession.
9  
2.3  Anticipating Post-Accession Control  
At least two conclusions can be drawn from the comparison of the CEECs’ state aid policies 
before and after accession: First, the study of the new Member states and the comparison of 
their policies before and after accession offer a unique opportunity to identify and isolate the 
particular EU impact on its Member states’ policies. Thus, insights from the new Member 
states  can  be  a  corrective  for  existing  Europeanization  research.  Second,  the  empirical 
evidence available so far points to a considerable impact of European state aid law on the 
policies of the new Member states. This impact, however, can mainly be traced back to post-
accession state aid control by the Commission and its anticipation on the national level rather 
than to accession requirements and conditionality.  
 
Methodologically, the new Member states are  highly interesting cases  because they bring 
variation  into  research  on  the  domestic  impact  of  European  integration.  Europeanization 
research in particular has been criticized for over-emphasizing the EU influence on domestic 
policies and for omitting alternative explanations. Haverland has labelled this shortcoming the 
‘no-variance  problem’  of  Europeanization  research  which  “is  typically  confined  to  EU 
member  states”  (Haverland  2006:  135).  Therefore,  he  argues  for  an  inclusion  of  non-EU 
                                                 
9 See online: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/k5_3.xls [30.04.2007].   12 
Member states into Europeanization research designs – well aware of potential disadvantages 
of  this  strategy:  countries  from  very  different  regions  might  lack  comparability  with  EU 
Member  states;  close  neighbours  are  exposed  to  indirect  EU  influences  (ibid.:  139f.). 
Studying the EU impact in the CEEC before and after accession might be an alternative way 
to  bring  variation  into  Europeanization  research.  Although  this  research  design  is  not 
unproblematic either, the above example demonstrates the usefulness of the approach.  
Adopting a typical ‘no-variance’ Europeanization research perspective and interpreting the 
above data on the development of the old Member states’ aid policies would probably lead us 
to identify little or no European impact. Despite the proclaimed goals, the overall EU-15 aid 
level  has  remained  almost  constant  in  recent  years;  the  redirection  of  state  aid  towards 
horizontal objectives has been rather modest. Overall state aid expenditures, one could argue, 
do not show the presence of significant European constraints on national aid policies (Dylla 
1997;  Dylla  1998).  Taking  into  account  state  aid  data  from  a  broader  time  period,  the 
conclusion might be different. Significant decreases in aid levels in the 1980s and 1990s 
across most EU Member states are attributed to the impact of European state aid control 
(Wolf 2005). However, one might object, the distinction of European and global influences is 
not possible within this research design.  
In contrast, the above data on the new Member states’ aid policies before and after accession 
support the argument that EU membership matters. With regard to previous EU enlargements 
an  opposite  argument  has  been  made  for  the  field  of  state  aid  policies:  “perhaps  formal 
integration in the form of membership is just that, a formality“ (Zahariadis 2002: 296). The 
strong ruptures in the CEECs’ aid policies before and after accession, however, cannot be 
explained but by the anticipated and actual effects of European state aid control. Domestic 
circumstances have not changed as rapidly and systematically across Member states as to 
explain  the  observations  made.  Global  factors  do  not  seem  very  plausible  either,  as  they 
would have to explain rapid changes in the new and mostly stable policies in the old Member 
states  at  the  same  time.  EU  accession  in  general  and  the  transfer  of  state  aid  control 
competences to the Commission in particular explain the changes in 2004 and 2005 as well as 
the ‘last minute’ aid measures in 2002 and 2003.  
 
Considering the literature on EU enlargement, the main puzzle of the above findings consists 
in the timing of the European impact on national state aid policies. The Europeanization of the 
CEECs  has  been  conceptualized  as  “as  a  process  in  which  states  adopt  EU  rules“ 
(Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2005b: 7) and accession conditionality has been considered the   13 
decisive facilitating factor in this process of rule transfer (Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2004). 
Accordingly, EU influence on domestic policies should have been strongest before accession 
and if any change was likely to occur post-accession, this change should have reflected a 
decline in EU influence. By contrast, accession preparations in the field of state aid seem to 
have had the opposite effect of what was intended in the long-run: state aid levels and the 
share of sectoral aid in the CEECs have risen. After accession, the state aid policies of the 
new Member states have become largely compatible with EU state aid rules and converge 
towards the EU-15 average. The latter observation fits well with other preliminary findings on 
post-accession  compliance,  describing  concerns  about  an  ‘eastern  problem’  as  “vastly 
exaggerated”  (Sedelmeier  2006a:  21;  Sedelmeier  2006b).  But  how  can  we  explain  this 
development  of  the  CEECs’  state  aid  policies  in  the  context  of  the  literature  on  EU 
enlargement?  
First of all, conceptualizing the adjustment of national state aid policies in the CEECs to 
European  law  as  an  instance  of  ‘rule  adoption’  might  be  misleading,  particularly  if  this 
implies  the  notion  of  a  process  of  continuous  approximation.  As  has  been  shown  above, 
European state aid rules are not meant to be transposed into national law, but they have to be 
considered  in  the  making  of  national  state  aid  policies  and  they  are  applied  by  the 
Commission in its state aid control. National state aid laws and the establishment of national 
state aid control authorities in the CEECs have been only temporary measures and they had a 
didactic function – familiarizing the candidate countries with the system of European state aid 
control – rather than the actual reproduction of this system on the national level. Thus, we can 
distinguish  two  clearly  different  institutional  settings  in  the  area  of  state  aid  control  and, 
correspondingly, its different effects on national state aid policies in the CEECs.  
Although pre-accession state aid policies in the CEECs did not reflect the long-term goals of 
European state aid control, this is far from saying that accession conditionality was without 
effect.  Accession  preparations  required  the  candidate  countries  increasingly  to  take  into 
account European rules on state aid control. The effect, however, was a rising awareness of 
the constraints of European state aid control and – anticipating these constraints – a policy of 
‘last-minute’ state aid measures before accession. Although this effect has probably not been 
intended by the Commission, it clearly indicates the success of accession conditionality in 
motivating the candidate countries to learn the rules of the game. To summarize, external 
incentives and social learning might not be as different processes as is sometimes suggested 
(Börzel/Risse 2003; Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2005a): In the field of state aid, accession 
conditionality was an incentive to learn.    14 
After accession, the impact of regular European state aid control has fully been realized; the 
‘last  minute’  measures  before  accession  have  been  more  than  compensated.  While  the 
instrument of accession conditionality is no longer available to the Commission, it has now 
the exclusive power to open formal investigations in state aid cases and to order recovery of 
illegally granted state aid. These instruments are much more suitable than the general stick of 
EU membership to differentiate between individual cases and to sanction or support certain 
state aid measures that are deemed (in)compatible with European state aid law. Moreover, in 
most cases, the Commission does not have to make use of its instruments. Only two negative 
Commission decisions in cases from the new Member states cannot explain the sharp decline 
in state aid levels after accession.
10 Instead, the risks of lengthy Commission investigations 
and of potentially negative decisions are already anticipated in the making of national state 
aid policies.  In particular, the performance of  national competition authorities in the new 
Member states has been rated above average in most background interviews with Commission 
officials  and  has  been  considered  a  success  of  the  accession  strategy.  Again,  it  is  the 
anticipation of Commission control that largely explains the changes in CEECs’ state aid 
policies.  
3  Comparison II: State Aid Policies of Different New 
Member States 
Despite the observed convergence of the average policies of the new towards the old Member 
states, considerable disparities between the state aid policies of individual countries persist. 
Following the indicators of state aid level and  state aid objectives,  we can identify three 
subgroups of old and new Member states with similar policy orientations. Two countries will 
be compared in greater detail: Both, Poland and the Czech Republic, can be classified into the 
group of countries that have been considered most problematic by the Commission before 
accession – after accession, however, their state aid policies have developed differently. 
Two conclusions are drawn from this country comparison: First, the state aid policies of some 
CEECs have already been largely compatible with European state aid rules in the early stages 
of the accession process and these policies have not undergone any major changes. As broadly 
debated  in  the  literature  on  Europeanization,  a  certain  ‘mismatch’  (Héritier/Knill/Mingers 
1996) between the national and European level is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
any  adjustments.  Second,  countries  with  a  similar  original  mismatch,  therefore,  may  still 
                                                 
10 A negative decision has been taken in the case Frucona Kosice (O.J. 2005, C 233); a partly negative decision 
has been concluded in the case Huta Czestochowa (O.J. 2004, C 204).   15 
differ in their adjustment of national state aid policies. While these differences could just 
depend  on  the  speed  of  adjustment,  there  are  strong  arguments  that  –  at  least  in  parts  – 
different national strategies in dealing with European state aid control may persist.  
3.1  Types of State Aid Policies 
In  principle,  four  different  state  aid  policy  orientations  can  be  described  with  the  two 
indicators of state aid levels and state aid objectives. For three of these types, we can find 
country  examples  among  the  old  as  well  as  among  the  new  Member  states.  While  some 
CEECs can be classified into the same category before and after accession, others have more 
or less fundamentally changed their state aid policy, most often by a reduction of sectoral aid.  
state aid level   
  low  high 
high  Estonia, Czech Republic (after)  Slovenia  share of 
horizontal aid  low  -  Poland, Czech Republic (before) 
Table 1 : Types of state aid policies 
 
First, some CEEC did not spend significant amounts of state aid already before accession and 
if they granted state aid, they spent it mostly on horizontal objectives. In particular the Baltic 
countries, Estonia in the most extreme form, are representative for this group of Member 
states, similar e.g. to the Netherlands or Luxemburg among the old Member states. Accession 
negotiations on competition policy have been finalized with these countries rather early and 
no transitional arrangements have been requested.  
  Another group of countries is using state aid instruments more frequently, but still 
mainly  for  horizontal  objectives.  Already  before  accession,  Slovenian  state  aid  policy 
displayed characteristics similar to countries like Sweden or Denmark.
11 All of these countries 
spend  state  aid  above  the  EU-25  average  level,  to  a  very  large  extent  or  exclusively  on 
horizontal objectives.  
   Finally, the largest group of CEECs was characterized by high aid levels and mainly 
sectoral aid objectives before accession. Although the state aid policies of Poland, Hungary, 
Malta and Cyprus have come closer to the EU-25 average, they still qualify for this group. 
The aid levels reached in these countries before accession are without comparison among the 
old Member states. Parallels exist to German state aid policy in the first half of the 1990s and 
to a certain extent to the cohesion countries Portugal or Spain. Accession negotiations with 
                                                 
11 In Sweden, state aid amounted to 0.8% of GDP and was spent entirely on horizontal objectives in 2005. 
Danish state aid amounted to 0.5% of GDP; the share of horizontal aid was 97.1%.   16 
this group of CEEC have involved some of the most controversial issues in the competition 
chapter and a series of transitional arrangements have been concluded.  
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Graph 3: State aid by new Member states as a percentage of GDP;   
Source: Online EU State Aid Scoreboard, Autumn 2006 
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Graph 4: Share of state aid to horizontal objectives by new Member states as a percentage of total aid; 
Source: Online EU State Aid Scoreboard, Autumn 2006   17 
Taking the Commission’s goals of a reduction of state aid expenditures and a redirection of 
state  aid  towards  horizontal  objectives  as  our  starting  point,  we  should  expect  the  most 
significant impact of European state aid control in the third group of countries and no or only 
limited influence on the first and second groups of countries. By and large, these expectations 
fit with our observations.  
In countries in which state aid is used very restrictively as a policy instrument anyway, the 
potential for further reductions or redirections of state aid due to European influences is very 
limited. Estonian state aid policy does not exhibit any major changes in recent years; having 
phased out certain types of sectoral aid, the same holds true for Latvian and Lithuanian state 
aid policies. 
As to the second group of countries, old Member states such as Sweden and Denmark have 
shown that significant levels of state aid are well compatible with European state aid control 
as long as the aid objectives are mainly horizontal. From a Commission point of view, these 
countries are even seen as good examples of how to balance the negative goal of protecting 
competition against the positive goals of state aid. The state aid policies of Slovenia and 
Slovakia, coming closest to this type, have not changed significantly after accession.  
Finally, most new Member states were characterized by high levels of mainly sectoral aid 
before accession – conflicting most strongly with the goals of the Commission – and, since 
then, they have changed their state aid policies more or less fundamentally. Out of this group, 
Poland and the Czech Republic have been chosen for country case studies as their state aid 
policies have changed after accession to very different degrees.  
3.2  Poland and the Czech Republic 
The development of Polish and Czech state aid policies will not be discussed separately, but 
in direct comparison of the two countries. First, the national systems  of state aid control 
before accession will be described. Subsequently, data on the Commission investigations and 
on the adjustment of national state aid policies after accession will be presented. Finally, two 
sets of controversial cases will serve as examples of different national approaches towards the 
Commission. As to the time before accession, similarities between the two countries dominate 
– differences intensify after accession.  
National State Aid Control before Accession 
Accession  preparations  and  negotiations  in  the  field  of  state  aid  were  among  the  most 
controversial and time-consuming of all issue areas, both, in the cases of Poland and the 
Czech Republic.    18 
The Europe Agreements entered into force in February 1994 in the case of Poland and in 
February 1995 in the case of the Czech Republic. While the Czech Association Council was 
able to agree upon so-called implementing rules on state aid control within the prescribed 
period of three years, it took until 2001 to arrive at similar rules for Poland. Both countries 
adopted their first state aid laws only in 2000 – the ‘Act on State Aid’ was adopted on 24 
February 2000 in the Czech Republic, the first Polish ‘Law on conditions of admissibility and 
supervision of State aid for entrepreneurs’ was passed on 30 June 2000 and later replaced by 
another law with the same title on 27 July 2002. While it was possible within Czech law to 
simply refer to European soft law provisions on the compatibility of state aid measures, Polish 
authorities were much more engaged in a temporary transposition of these rules into national 
law. As of May 2004, national state aid laws and according regulations became obsolete and 
have been replaced by the ‘Law on the procedural issues concerning public aid’ in Poland and 
the ‘Act on the regulation of certain relationships within the area of state aid’ in the Czech 
Republic.
12 
The task of controlling national state aid measures as quasi-Commissions before accession 
was delegated to the Office for Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKiK) in Poland 
and to the Office for the Protection of Competition (ÚOHS) in the Czech Republic. The 
president of UOKiK, directly subordinated to the Polish prime minister, had the competence 
to  control  and  even  to  order  recovery  of  illegally  granted  state  aid  (Sowa  2003:  10; 
Paczkowska-Tomaszewska/Jaros/Winiarski  2006).  In  the  Czech  Republic,  the  task  of 
monitoring  national  state  aid  was  first  established  within  the  Ministry  of  Finance  and 
transferred to ÚOHS in 2000 (Bednár 2005). Data on the enforcement record of these national 
monitoring authorities is not very instructive and hardly comparable. As to UOKiK, all 64 
Polish measures under control in the so-called interim procedure between 2002 and April 
2004 have been approved and many of these cases have been notified to the Commission just 
on 29 or 30 April 2004 (Ambroziak/Kaliszuk 2004: 166). The Czech state aid decisions are 
better  documented  in  the  annual  reports  of  ÚOHS
13:  In  total,  the  office  has  taken  690 
decisions on state aid measures from 2000 to 2004, out of which about 20 decisions have been 
negative.  
In its progress reports, the Commission has evaluated the overall development of national 
state aid authorities and laws increasingly positive in both countries – the enforcement record, 
                                                 
12 Both legal acts are available online on the websites of the national competition authorities. See for the Polish 
state aid law: http://www.uokik.gov.pl/en/legal_regulations/national_legal_acts/state_aid/ [05.05.2006]. See for 
the Czech state aid law: http://www.compet.cz/en/state-aid/legislation/ [05.05.2006].   
13 Online: http://www.compet.cz/en/information-centre/annual-reports/ [05.05.2006].   19 
however,  was  not  seen  as  entirely  satisfactory  even  in  the  last  monitoring  report  2003. 
Chapter  6  on  competition  was  among  the  last  chapters  to  be  concluded  during  accession 
negotiations: in October 2002 in the case of the Czech Republic and just in December 2002 in 
the case of Poland. Similar transitional arrangements have been concluded with both countries 
in order to allow the restructuring of their steel industries until the end of 2006 within pre-
defined limits. Further transitional arrangements with Poland concern the phasing-out of fiscal 
aid in special economic zones and certain types of environmental aid (vgl. Känkänen 2003; 
Schütterle 2004). 
European State Aid Control after Accession 
Since May 2004, the Commission’s workload in the field of state aid control has increased 
significantly  due  to  cases  from  the  new  Member  states.  Until  the  end  of  2006,  the 
Commission has decided in 297 cases from the CEECs.
14 Out of these, the largest number of 
state aid measures under investigation was from Poland (90 cases), followed by cases from 
the Czech Republic (64), Slovakia (48) and other CEECs (with each 20 or less cases). In 29 
cases from the new Member states, the Commission has opened formal investigations
15 of 
which 15 concern Polish aid measures and 3 are related to Czech aid measures.
16 The vast 
majority of these cases concern individual state aid measures for rescuing and restructuring 
firms in difficulty. Polish cases do not only account for more than half of the entire number of 
cases – moreover, whereas most cases from other CEECs are limited to questions from the 
transitional period around accession, there are constantly new investigations added in Polish 
cases.  
As to the reduction of  state aid levels and the redirection of state aid towards horizontal 
objectives
17, the adjustment of Czech state aid policy has been most pronounced among all 
new Member states. Already in the first year of Czech EU membership, the national state aid 
level has fallen below the EU-25 average and sectoral aid has been reduced almost to zero. 
The same indicators exhibit significant adjustments of Polish state aid policy as well – yet, 
changes have been less strong and they have taken place later than in the Czech case. While 
there are no obvious reasons to doubt the sustainability of the changes in the Czech Republic, 
                                                 
14 Data compiled from the State Aid Register of DG Competition, see footnote 2. 
15 The opening of a formal investigation procedure by the Commission must not be equated with non-compliance 
as,  formally,  it  does  not  prejudge  the  Commission’s  final  decision  on  the  compatibility  of  a  measure  with 
European state aid rules. However, the Commission only launches an inquiry if it harbours concrete doubts about 
the  compatibility  of  a  measure  and  the  likelihood  of  a  negative  decision  increases  significantly  once  the 
procedure is opened.  
16 See Annex I for a list of all Polish and Czech cases in which formal investigations have been opened by the 
Commission so far.  
17 See Annex II for absolute and relative figures on state aid levels and state aid objectives in Poland and in the 
Czech Republic from 2000 to 2005.    20 
the picture is less clear with regard to Poland. If the Commission eventually approves some of 
the larger Polish state aid measures that are currently suspended until a final decision has been 
reached, the Polish state aid level would rise again significantly; the share of horizontal aid 
would fall. 
Official statements from both countries on the overall development of European state aid 
control and on national state aid policies also indicate differing positions after enlargement. In 
its strategy paper on national state aid policy for the period from 2005 to 2010, the Polish 
Council of Ministers has reaffirmed the priority of rescue and restructuring aid in overcoming 
secotral crises.
18 In its comments on the Commission’s State Aid Action Plan, Poland has 
criticized a perceived lack of sensitivity on part of the European Commission to issues of 
economic transition in the new Member states.
19 Representatives from the Czech Republic, in 
contrast, have been remarkably silent as to potential criticisms towards the Commission and 
have largely supported the Commission’s reform plans.
20  
Controversial Cases  
Before accession, fiscal aid in Polish and other CEECs’ special economic zones has led to a 
highly political controversy in which the Commission had to step back from some of its initial 
demands (see Ambroziak/Kaliszuk 2004; Bohle/Husz 2005). Another area of political conflict 
has been the transitional arrangement for restructuring the steel industries in Poland and in the 
Czech Republic. Two final Commission decisions on alleged state aid  to steel producers, 
positive in the Czech case
21 and mixed in the Polish case
22, show interesting similarities and 
differences between the two countries’ approaches towards Commission control. Most telling, 
however, are two sets of restructuring measures concerning the Czech banking sector and the 
largest Polish shipyards.  
The latter measures involve probably the highest profile cases from all new Member states. 
The Commission has already been observing the developments in the Polish shipbuilding 
industry with caution before accession and has critically reminded Polish authorities of their 
obligations under European state aid law in its monitoring report 2003. Due to insufficient 
documentation,  the  Commission  refused  to  consider  several  Polish  measures  as  already 
                                                 
18 Online: http://www.mgip.gov.pl/Programy/ [05.05.2007]. For an in-depth comparison of the Polish state aid 
strategy and the State Aid Action Plan of the Commission, see (Ambroziak 2005). 
19  Polish  comments  to  the  State  Aid  Action  Plan,  Online: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/state_aid/others/action_plan/consult/36391.pdf [05.05.2007].   
20  Czech  Office  for  the  Protection  of  Competition,  Annual  Report  2005,  p.23.  Online: 
http://www.compet.cz/en/information-centre/annual-reports/ [29.11.2006].  
21 See:  „ State aid: Commission concludes Czech steel producer Třinecké železárny received no illegal aid”, 
Commission press release IP/06/1532, 09.11.2006. 
22  See:    „State  aid:  Commission  concludes  no  aid  involved  in  restructuring  of  Polish  steel  company  Huta 
Czestochowa,  but  orders  recovery  of  €4  million  restructuring  aid”,  Commission  press  release  IP/05/842, 
06.07.2005.     21 
finalized before accession (Cierna 2005) and has opened formal investigations concerning the 
three  largest  Polish  shipyards  in  Szczecin,  Gdynia  and  Gdansk  in  June  2005.
23  Several 
Commission deadlines to submit restructuring plans for achieving long-term viability of the 
shipyards have not been met by the Polish authorities.
24 Currently, the Commission requires 
Polish  authorities  to  submit  plans  for  reducing  the  production  capacity  of  the  enterprises 
affected by 40% in order to approve their restructuring – a requirement that is rejected by 
Poland as it would negatively affect the value of the enterprises and, thus, reduce the expected 
benefit  of  their  privatization.
25  A  negative  decision  would  most  likely  bring  about  the 
bankruptcy  of  the  shipyards  and  would  affect  about  16,000  workers  in  the  shipyards 
themselves and 80,000  workers in other companies.
26 On the Polish side, Prime Minister 
Kaczynski  has  signalled  his  determination  to  save  the  shipyards  even  against  a  negative 
Commission decision: “The European Commission acts within the framework of European 
law […] But if you ask me the question: am I ready to defend - at all costs - the shipyards 
where I spent weeks as a Solidarity demonstrator? The answer is ,I am ready to defend them. 
At all costs".
27  
The restructuring of the Czech banking sector also involved considerable amounts of state aid 
and could have led to similar controversies. However, the Commission and Czech authorities 
were able to reach a compromise before accession and, thus, managed to keep most potential 
for conflict out of the regular system of European state aid control. In total, 16 measures 
related to the restructuring of the Czech banking sector had been notified to the Commission 
by  the  Czech  Republic  under  the  interim  procedure.  In  the  following,  the  Commission 
required  the  Czech  authorities  to  retroactively  justify  the  measures  by  elaborating 
restructuring plans for the enterprises concerned and to limit the duration and financial burden 
of the aid measures. In some cases, these requirements have been fulfilled ‘just in time’ on 30 
April 2004; in one case even later on 28 June 2004 (see Rapp 2005: 414). In exchange, the 
Commission, in a rather innovative interpretation of its own rules and deviating from former 
practice,  declared  itself  incompetent  to  investigate  these  cases  as  the  aid  measures  were 
                                                 
23 See “State aid: Restructuring of Polish shipyards under Commission scrutiny”, Commission press release 
IP/05/644, 01.06.2005.  
24  See  “EU/STATE  AID:  Commission  still  waiting  for  shipyard  restructuring  plans”,  Agence  Europe,  5 
September 2006. 
25 See “Shipyard Production Divides Poland and EU “, Polish News Bulletin, 16 March 2007. 
26 See “That sinking feeling - Polish shipyards need profits not public patronage”, Financial Times, 30 August 
2006, p.12. 
27 Cited according to the Irish Times, 6 September 2006, p.11: “Polish shipyards' survival threatened as EU eyes 
state aid”.    22 
‘granted before’ and were ‘not applicable after accession’.
28 The de facto positive decision of 
the Commission in the other Czech banking cases was considered a big success by the Czech 
authorities. 
The Limits of Convergence  
Although  no  major  compliance  problems  have  so  far  arisen  with  regard  to  the  state  aid 
policies of the new Member states, the domestic impact of European state aid control varies 
considerably.  While  the  dichotomy  of  ‘compliance’  vs.  ‘non-compliance’  seems  too 
undifferentiated to grasp this variation, other categories from the literature on Europeanization 
are better suited to describe and to explain the observed differences across Member states.  
 
The concept of ‘mismatch’ (Héritier/Knill/Mingers 1996) or ‘misfit’ (Dunia 1999) has been 
applied  implicitly  to  differentiate  between  different  types  of  state  aid  policies  and  the 
respective  adaptational  pressures  arising  on  them  from  European  state  aid  control.  The 
concept  has  been  debated  in  Europeanization  research  as  a  necessary  but  not  sufficient 
condition  for  domestic  change  due  to  European  integration  (Börzel/Risse  2003:  60f.). 
Although, in principle, the concept is broad enough to be applied to very diverse forms of 
Europeanization, it has  been mainly used in the context of the national transposition and 
implementation of European secondary law (see e.g. Risse/Green Cowles/Caporaso 2001: 6).  
In the analysis at hand, the Commission’s goals of a reduction of state aid and its redirection 
towards horizontal objectives have served as standards against which it was possible to judge 
the (in)compatibility of national state aid policies with European law. Thus, the concept of 
‘misfit’ has been used in a case of negative integration and basic insights from the literature 
on Europeanization have been confirmed. On the one hand, we have found two different types 
of state aid policies in the CEEC – characterized by low aid levels or higher levels of mostly 
horizontal aid – that are largely compatible with European state aid law and that have not 
undergone major changes. On the other hand, changes in state aid policies have mainly taken 
place in those new Member states that exhibited significant incompatibilities with European 
state aid law before accession. Within this group of countries, however, the domestic impact 
of European state aid control still varies. An additional explanation beyond the degree of 
misfit is necessary.  
 
                                                 
28 The only case in which the Commission decided to open formal investigations was the Agrobanka/GE Capital 
case. So far, no final decision has been taken by the Commission. See: “Formal investigation concerning State 
aid measures in favour of Czech bank Agrobanka”, Commission press release IP/04/904, 14.07.2004.   23 
There are at least two alternative explanations why similar adaptational pressures might be 
filtered differently on the national level. Both, Polish and Czech state aid policies have been 
characterized by high aid levels and low shares of horizontal aid before accession – after 
accession,  however,  they  have  not  developed  in  the  same  way.  On  the  one  hand,  the 
adjustment of national state aid policies towards European state aid control might just be a 
question of time; different state aid policies in the short period after accession might just 
reflect differences in the speed of adjustment. On the other hand, national strategies in dealing 
with European state aid control might persistently differ.  
Focusing on the speed  of adjustment seems plausible for several reasons. Already before 
accession, variance in the transfer of acquis rules to the CEEC has been found to be mainly 
limited to questions of timing (Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2004: 672). A comparison of the 
development of state aid levels in Poland and in the Czech Republic supports this explanation. 
For the most part, the shape of the Polish curve is very close to the Czech curve, just with a 
one-year time lag (see  graph 5). While the state aid level in the Czech Republic already 
started to fall in 2003, it reached its height in Poland in the same year. In its progress reports 
before accession, the Commission repeatedly evaluated the Czech accomplishments in the 
field  of  state  aid  control  as  satisfactory  slightly  earlier  than  in  the  Polish  case.  As  the 
examples of controversial cases have shown, Czech authorities managed to conclude many 
problematic cases just in time before accession while the Commission still investigates in a 
series of Polish cases from the interim period.  
   24 
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Graph 5: Polish and Czech state aid as a percentage of GDP;  
Source: Online EU State Aid Scoreboard, Autumn 2006 
 
Given the short period of observation, however, the evidence has to be treated with caution. 
An alternative explanation for the different adjustments of Polish and Czech state aid policies 
after accession might consist in persistently different strategies in dealing with European state 
aid control. On the one side, Member states can maximize certainty of getting Commission 
approval for their state aid measures while accepting (self-)constrained state aid policies. On 
the other side, Member states can maximize their autonomy in state aid policies while bearing 
the costs of legally uncertain control procedures and of defending their state aid measures in 
conflict with the Commission (see Modzelewska-Wachal 2003).  
The Czech strategy in dealing with Commission control comes closer to the first ideal type; 
the Polish strategy corresponds to the second ideal type. The Czech banking cases have shown 
how both sides, the Commission and the Czech authorities, have been willing to compromise 
in order to avoid lasting conflicts after accession. In several interviews, Czech officials have 
admitted a lack of confidence and anticipatory obedience to the Commission. In 2005, 7 out 
of 28 notifications have already been taken back by the Czech competition authority before a 
Commission decision was taken.
29 One Czech interview partner stated that even in areas in 
which  European  state  aid  rules  leave  room  for  different  policies  one  would  like  to  have 
policies “dictated by the Commission” in order to minimize uncertainty and avoid conflicts. 
                                                 
29 Czech Office for the Protection of Competition, Annual Report 2005, p.24. See footnote 20.   25 
In contrast, the Polish shipyard cases are the most striking examples of an uncompromising 
strategy  towards  European  state  aid  control.  The  Polish  government  has  signalled  its 
determinedness to give national policy goals precedence over European concerns in these 
cases.  Interview  partners  from  Poland  have  repeatedly  admitted  the  uncompromising 
character  of  this  strategy  while  expressing  astonishment  for  the  willingness  of  other  new 
Member states such as the Czech Republic to adjust their state aid measures and to refrain 
from criticism with regard to the Commission. So far, Poland has been successful in avoiding 
negative Commission decisions and in the shipyard cases it also seems more likely that the 
Commission will take a positive, although conditional, decision.
30 The costs of this strategy, 
however, are considerable: the Commission’s investigations in several interim cases continue 
even  in  the  fourth  year  of  Poland’s  EU  membership,  involving  a  high  degree  of  legal 
uncertainty for the enterprises affected. Within the Commission, particularly at the level of 
case handlers within DG Competition, dissatisfaction with the collision course of Polish state 
policy rises and might lead to increasingly strict assessments of Polish state aid measures.  
4  Conclusion: Complying with Rules of Negative 
Integration  
In sum, we have identified a significant impact of European state aid law on the policies of 
the new Member states, being based on permanent state aid control by the Commission rather 
than on accession conditionality. Variation across Member states partly depends on different 
state aid policy orientations. Even among states with similar orientations before accession, 
however, the impact varies due to differences in the speed of adjustment or different national 
strategies in dealing with Commission control.  
Discussing these findings in a broader context, European state aid control can be seen as an 
exemplary  field  for  understanding  how  rules  of  negative  integration  impact  on  domestic 
policies  and  what  complying  with  rules  of  negative  integration  means.  Research  on  the 
domestic impact of international institutions, Europeanization research most prominently, is 
often framed in terms of implementation and compliance (see Treib 2006). Typically, this 
implies that a certain international norm or policy is taken as given, the process of translating 
it into national action is called implementation and the final outcome is measured with regard 
to its rule conformity (ibid.: 4). This understanding, however, is problematic in the realm of 
negative integration for several reasons.  
                                                 
30 “No Shipyard Closures, Says Economy Minister”; Polish News Bulletin, 7 February 2007.   26 
To begin with, negative rules such as in European state aid law do not require states to take 
action  but,  on  the  contrary,  they  mostly  require  states  to  refrain  from  certain  actions. 
Moreover, restrictions are not formulated as exhaustive catalogues of actions to be omitted 
but as general prohibitions to hinder free trade or to distort competition. Hence, the misfit 
between European state aid law and national policies and the necessary adjustments can only 
be identified with regard to concrete cases and no once-and-for-all solution to comply with 
negative rules is available.  
Implementing  the  state  aid  acquis  during  accession  preparations,  thus,  did  not  require 
transposition  into  national  law  but  taking  European  rules  into  account  in  the  making  of 
national state aid policies. One interview partner from Poland has labelled this process of 
adjusting  to  rules  of  negative  integration  as  “implementation  in  practice”.  The  goals  of 
reducing and redirecting state aid towards horizontal objectives have been used as indicators 
in order to evaluate the adjustment of national state aid policies towards European state aid 
law. It is, however, not these overall goals that are implemented by EU Member states, e.g. in 
the form of binding maximum aid levels or minimum shares of horizontal aid, but European 
state aid law is applied on a case-by-case basis by the Commission – making it more difficult 
to grant certain types of state aid while leaving more room for manoeuvre in the area of 
horizontal aid and, thus, indirectly leading to lower aid levels and higher shares of horizontal 
aid.  
The concrete meaning of compliance or non-compliance with rules of negative integration, 
finally, has to be established on a case-by-case basis as well. Aid levels and aid objectives 
provide  us  with  a  first  hint  at  potentially  more  or  less  problematic  state  aid  policies. 
Nevertheless, we have seen that higher aid levels may well be compatible with European law 
as long as state aid is mainly granted towards horizontal objectives. In concrete cases, it is 
often unclear at the outset – both,  for the Commission as well as for the Member states 
involved  –  what  is  compatible  or  incompatible  with  European  rules.  The  final  outcome, 
usually compliance, may not always result from national adjustments only, but it may also 
involve elements of a compromise between different interpretations and policy preferences as 
the Czech banking cases have shown.  
The notions of implementation and compliance, thus, are not inapplicable to the realm of 
negative  integration,  but  they  have  to  be  understood  slightly  different  in  order  to  fully 
comprehend the domestic impact of rules of negative integration.    27 
Annex I 
 
Case no.  beneficiary  type  objective  investigation 
launched 
decision 
C 55/2006  Bison-Bial  individual  r&r  2006-12-20   
C 52/2006  Odlewni Zeliwa Srem  individual  r&r  2006-12-06   
C 51/2006  Arcelor Huta Warszawa  individual  r&r  2006-12-06   
C 32/2006  Huta Cynku Miasteczko S.  individual  r&r  2006-07-18   
C 23/2006  Technologie Buczek  individual  r&r  2006-06-07   
C 49/2005  Chemobudowa Krakow  individual  r&r  2005-12-21  withdrawn 
C 44/2005  Huta Stalowa Wola   individual  r&r  2005-11-23  positive 
C 43/2005  Stranded costs   individual  other  2005-11-23   
C 22/2005  Poczta Polska  scheme  other  2005-06-29  withdrawn 
C 21/2005  Poczta Polska  individual  other  2005-06-29   
C 19/2005  Stocznia Szczecinska Nowa  individual  r&r  2005-06-01   
C 18/2005  Stocznia Gdanska  individual  r&r  2005-06-01   
C 17/2005  Stocznia Gdynia   individual  r&r  2005-06-01   
C 3/2005  Daewoo / FSO  individual  r&r  2005-01-19  conditional 
C 20/2004  Huta Częstochowa  individual  r&r  2004-05-19  mixed 
Table 2: Formal investigations in Polish cases; Source: State Aid Register (DG Comp) 
 
Case no.  beneficiary  type  objective  investigation 
launched 
decision 
C 12/2006  Transport combiné   scheme  r&r  2006-04-04   
C 45/2004   Trinecke Zelezarny  individual  r&r  2004-12-14  positive 
C 27/2004  Agrobanka  individual  r&r  2004-07-14   
Table 3: Formal investigations in Czech cases; Source: State Aid Register (DG Comp) 
 
Annex II 
 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
state aid (in Mio. €)  1850,1  1465,4  997,9  6005,8  2033,7  907,6 
- as a share of GDP in %  0,88  0,63  0,44  2,93  0,97  0,37 
of which horizontal aid  1220,8  447,9  389,2  899,3  524,1  638,9 
- as a share of total aid in %  66  31  39  15  26  70 
Table 4: State Aid Levels and Objectives in Poland; 
Source: Online EU State Aid Scoreboard, Autumn 2006 
 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
state aid (in Mio. €)  1686,6  1445,4  3296,3  2337,5  268,9  387,0 
- as a share of GDP in %  2,44  1,95  3,97  2,82  0,31  0,39 
of which horizontal aid  242,8  273,2  338,0  227,7  221,0  385,3 
- as a share of total aid in %  14  19  10  10  82  100 
Table 5: State Aid Levels and Objectives in the Czech Republic; 
Source: Online EU State Aid Scoreboard, Autumn 2006 
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